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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNALS’ GENESIS, WWII
EXPERIENCE, AND FUTURE RELEVANCE
Henry Korn*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is generally known that during World War II (“WWII”), the Allies agreed
that following the war, Nazi leaders would face charges of violating international
law for the conduct of the war and the extermination of innocent people based on
their religious beliefs, and they would face the prospect of death by a military
tribunal hearing the evidence. What is not generally known is that the Allies had no
precedent for creating an international tribunal and defining anew the very war
crimes they would face—an approach that some considered to be ex post facto laws.
The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg was the first time government
officials, military leaders, and citizens of a defeated nation were tried under
principles of international law in tribunals jointly established by victor nations to
hear and sentence the defendants involving crimes that did not appear in any national
body of penal laws.1 This Article discusses precedent, offers personal insights into
the proceedings, and suggests the future holds a limited role for such proceedings.
The Allies could have ditched the entire endeavor and lined the war criminals
against a wall and shot them. The sentiment offered by Jerome Shaker, a New York
City resident, in a telegram to President Truman on October 12, 1946 makes that
point:
Today, Columbus Day, is the birthday of a great, generous and proud
nation. May I please be permitted to contribute enclosed check of $10.00
to pay for the expense of bullets instead of a rope for members of the
German High Command to be executed at Nurnberg Germany. May God
Bless the President of the United States for his generosity in granting my
plea.2

*

© 2017 Henry Korn. Thanks to Julianna Meely, a student at Cornell University, who
assisted with research for preparation of the Article during the summer of 2016.
1
See The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International
Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany 1, 49–50 (1945) [hereinafter Proceedings]
(quoting Justice Robert Jackson as saying “The privilege of opening the first trial in history
for crimes against the peace of the world imposes a grave responsibility.”); see also TELFORD
TAYLOR, ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 47 (1st ed., 1972).
2
Telegram from Jerome Shaker to Harry S. Truman on Oct. 12, 1946, HARRY S.
TRUMAN: LIBRARY & MUSEUM, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_
collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?documentid=2-9&pagenumber=1
[https://perma.cc/FBW8-KNHW].
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The Allied leaders had no doubt that targeting German military leaders for all
out aggressive war (one of the internationally defined war crimes for the later
proceedings) would be judged with skepticism, conflicting with the famous maxim:
“war is cruelty,” as General William Tecumseh Sherman said 100 years before to
justify defeat of an enemy force.3 As he said, “we can make war so terrible that they
will realize . . . however brave and gallant and devoted to their country, still they are
mortal and should exhaust all peaceful remedies before they fly to war.”4 To one of
his cavalry commanders, he would “propose to leave a trail that will be recognized
fifty years hence.”5 He would wage “aggressive war,” and “[i]f the people raise a
howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that war is war, and not
popularity seeking.”6
The Allies chose a jurisprudential course for Nazi officials. The United States,
Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union executed the London Agreement
(“Agreement”) of August 8, 1945 to establish the International Military Tribunals in
order to prosecute individuals identified as Nazi war criminals.7 August 8th was
Victory in Europe (“VE”) Day, as the Germans surrendered, but the genesis of this
Agreement was years before—after the December 7, 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor, after the Nazis declared war on the United States, before D-Day, and at a
time when the outcome of the war was uncertain.8 The Germans controlled the
European continent. Only Great Britain was free of Germany’s European
hegemony.9
3

Letter of William T. Sherman to James M. Calhoun, E.E. Rawson, and S.C. Wells,
September 12, 1864, CIVIL WAR ERA NC, http://cwnc.omeka.chass.ncsu.edu/items/show/23
[https://perma.cc/G3TM-7PUB].
4
Letter from William T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman (October 22, 1862), in THE
SHERMAN LETTERS: CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERAL AND SENATOR SHERMAN FROM
1837 TO 1891 (ed. Rachel Sherman Thorndike, 1894).
5
WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN, MEMOIRS OF GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN 38 (2010).
6
Id. at 38–39.
7
Proceedings, supra note 1, at 1.
8
The initial decision of the Allies to convene an international military tribunal to
prosecute the Nazi leaders was made in October 1943, over 9 months before the Allies landed
at Normandy to liberate Europe from Nazi domination. Clearly, Germany controlled Europe
when the Allies conceived the war crimes tribunals as the modality to deal with the Nazi
officials when war came to an end.
9
In a resolution dated October 10, 1943, the Executive Committee of the League of
Nations Union announced that individuals, including governmental officials, military
officials and industrialists, in Germany should be prosecuted by international military
tribunals for war crimes, including a system of terror by slaughter and torture, “unjustified
by any military necessity and aimed at men, women and children of all ages and in certain
cases dictated by racial or religious prejudice as in the wholesale massacre of Jews.”
Statement, Punishment and Prevention of War Crimes, Resolution of the Executive
Committee of the League of Nations Union, October 10, 1943, HARRY S. TRUMAN: LIBRARY
& MUSEUM, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/docu
ments/index.php?documentdate=1943-10-10&documentid=C107-10-2&pagenumber=1
[https://perma.cc/573N-SXV4].
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The War Crimes prosecutions did not just involve the Nazis; there were
prosecutions of Japanese war criminals, although the US chose not to prosecute the
Emperor for clearly political reasons.10 The decision on the Japanese front to
selectively prosecute its principal civilian and military officials, excluding the
Emperor from consideration and eventually the U.S. decision by 1954 to commute
the prison terms of all remaining incarcerated Nazi defendants by 1954, leads to the
conclusion that in the end the use of military tribunals to target national figures for
war crimes is fundamentally a political consideration which this Article discusses
below.11
II. THE AUTHORIZING ALLIES AGREEMENT & PRECEDENT
The Declaration of the Four Nations, or the Four Power Declaration, was signed
on October 30, 1943 by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union,
and the Republic of China at what is known as the Moscow Conference.12 The
Declaration formally established the four-power framework that would later
influence the international order of the postwar world. Thereafter, the Agreement
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major European Axis War Criminals was
signed by the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and the Provisional
Government of France on August 8, 1945.13 It established an International Military
Tribunal (“IMT”) to prosecute Nazi war criminals.14 The specifics of how war
criminals would be arraigned, prosecuted, and, if found guilty, sentenced, were
identified in the Charter of the IMT, adopted by the Allies on execution of the
Agreement.15
The most revolutionary of the provisions of the Charter was its definition of
war crimes. Article 6 of the Charter specified the nature of international war crimes
subject to the IMT jurisdiction.16 These crimes found no precedent in any national
10

H.W. BRANDS, THE GENERAL VS. THE
THE BRINK OF NUCLEAR WAR 19–20 (2016).
11

PRESIDENT: MACARTHUR AND TRUMAN AT

The decision of then Secretary of State John J. McCloy, with the support of President
Eisenhower, to commute the prison terms of the Nazi officials was part of the U.S. effort to
reintegrate Germany into a European force to confront the Soviet Union during the Civil
War. See id. at 9; see also TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 640.
12
Declaration of German Atrocities, 9 DEP’T ST. BULL. 310 (1943), http://www.legaltools.org/doc/3c6e23/ [https://perma.cc/7PFH-RAGN].
13
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Fr.-U.K.-U.S.-S.S.R., Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 83 U.N.T.S. 279
[hereinafter London Agreement], http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtchart.asp [https://perma.
cc/TF75-NVCL].
14
Id.
15
See id. at 1544–45; Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 284.
16
The Charter consists of five pages and specifies what the “Crimes” are, the general
procedural stages for the proceedings through judgment and sentencing, and the general
rights of the accused to a “fair trial.” Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8,
1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 284. There is no provision in the Charter for a convicted
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criminal law. These crimes were new to jurisprudence. The Charter also established
the first body of international war crime law and the principle of accountability for
leaders of a country where such crimes were committed.
The Article 6 crimes included “crimes against peace,” defined in Article 6 of
the Charter as the “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression,
or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the
foregoing.”17 The Article 6 offenses included “war crimes,” defined in the same
Article as
violations of the laws or customs of war. . . . [I]nclud[ing], but not limited
to, murder, ill treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or illtreatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns
or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.18
Lastly, the IMT was authorized to adjudicate “crimes against humanity,” defined as
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether
or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.19
The accountability principle was also specified in Article 6, and it provided that
“[l]eaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation
or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes
are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.”20
Where did the drafters of the Charter find the precedent for such revolutionary
legal principles? Surprising as it sounds, the precedent may be found during the
American Civil War, and its source was a military code drafted by a former Prussian
officer who immigrated to the United States before the Civil War and whose sons
fought on both sides of that conflict.21 The precedent is the Lieber Code drafted by
Franz Lieber and adopted in 1863 by President Lincoln as a code Union forces were
expected to follow.22
individual appealing to a higher tribunal. See id. Based on the author’s review of available
resources concerning the Nuremberg proceedings, the author concludes there was no appeal
process afforded to the accused.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 8–9.
22
Id.
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The Lieber Code23 insisted upon the humane, ethical treatment of populations
in occupied areas.24 It was the first codified law that expressly forbade giving “no
quarter” to the enemy (i.e., killing prisoners of war), except in such cases when the
survival of the unit that held these prisoners was threatened.25 It forbade the use of
poisons, stating that use of such puts any force who uses them entirely outside the
pale of the civilized nations.26 It forbade the use of torture to extract confessions.27
It described the rights and duties of prisoners of war and of capturing forces.28 It
described the how war was to be conducted in occupied territories, the ends of war,
and discussed permissible and impermissible means to attain those ends.29
Other than the Leiber Code, in their consideration of precedent for the creation
of the international war crimes tribunals, the Allies could look to the 1899 and 1907
Hague Conventions.30 For example, the Hague Convention (III) of 1907 prohibited
commencement of hostilities between nations without explicit warning.31 Use of
poisonous gas, later introduced by Germany and used by all major belligerents
throughout WWI, violated the Hague Declaration (IV, 2) of 1899 and Convention
(IV) of 1907.32
After WWI, the Allies convened a Peace Conference in Versailles in 1919 and
appointed a fifteen-member Commission to review war crimes during that war.33
The Commission defined war crimes as “offenses against the laws and customs of
war or the laws of humanity,” rendering offenders liable to criminal prosecution.34
Although the Commissioners concluded that Germany had declared war in
pursuance of a policy of aggression, they believed that a trial on that issue would be
very prolonged and difficult since International law had not yet advanced to a stage
where a premeditated war of aggression would be treated as a punishable offense
under established law.35 The Americans, in particular, argued that no international
23

FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES IN THE UNITED
STATES IN THE FIELD (Wash., Gov’t Printing Office 1898).
24
See id. at 14.
25
Id. at 21.
26
Id. at 23.
27
Id. at 8.
28
See id. at 20.
29
See id. at 31.
30
TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 10–11, 13.
31
Hague Convention (III) Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, art. 1–2, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2259.
32
Hague Declaration (IV, 2) Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899, 26
Martens Nouveau Recueil (2d) 998; Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, art. 23, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277.
33
The Commission, chaired by U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, concluded: “All
persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their position . . . who have been guilty
of offenses against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity are liable to criminal
prosecution.” See Benjamin B. Ferencz, International Criminal Courts: The Legacy of
Nuremberg, 10 PACE INT’L L. REV. 203, 207 (1998).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 208–09.
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court had ever before tried a sovereign head of state for aggressive war.36 For the
future, however, the Commissioners recommended that penal sanctions be provided
“for such grave outrages against the elementary principles of international law.”37
To avoid allegations of ex post facto law, the German Kaiser was not charged
with aggression, but, instead, the Treaty of Versailles provided that he would be
arraigned “for a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of
treaties.”38 Other Germans who had committed war crimes or atrocities would be
handed over for trial by allied courts.39 But Germany refused to honor the Treaty,
and Holland, noting that there was no competent international criminal court
available to act on the basis of existing statutes making aggression by a sovereign
punishable, refused to extradite the Kaiser and he was never tried.40 German officers
who committed atrocities were not handed over either and got off with light
sentences by a German court.41
III. WAR CRIMES AND PROCEDURE
The elements of the war crimes charged against the Nazi defendants thus were
unprecedented. The prosecutors were working with new clay to frame the charges
within the procedural charter adopted by the Allies. The magnitude of this enterprise
is keenly summarized in the October 7, 1946 letter that Justice Robert H. Jackson
wrote to President Truman, the original of which is archived at the Truman Library
in Independence, Missouri.42 As Justice Jackson advised President Truman:
•
•
•
•

36

The first trial of Nazi governmental officials and military leaders began
on November 20, 1945 and occupied 216 trial days.
33 witnesses were called by the prosecution and subject to defense
attorneys’ cross examination.
The defense attorneys called 61 witnesses and 19 of the 22 defendants
testified in their defense.
143 other witnesses called by the defense attorneys gave testimony
through written interrogatories.

Id. at 208.
Id. at 207.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
The author visited the Truman Library on October 30, 2016 and was permitted to
access all relevant documents involving the origins of, war crimes charges, and procedure,
and viewpoints expressed by senior government officials, including President Truman, about
these proceedings.
37
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The proceedings were conducted and recorded in 4 languages, English,
German, French, and Russian, and daily transcripts in the language of the
choice of the attorneys were prepared.43
The English transcript covered over 17,000 pages.
For the trial preparation, Justice Jackson stated that over 100,000 captured
German documents were screened and examined and about 4,000 were
translated into the 4 languages and used in whole or in part at the trial and
marked as trial exhibits.
Of the millions of feet of captured film, over 100,000 feet were presented
at trial as exhibits.
Over 25,000 photographs were examined by the prosecution and more
than 1,800 were trial exhibits, and Hitler’s photographer was a
prosecution witness who authenticated the photographs.
Justice Jackson also summarized the administrative aspects of trial
preparation and trial, stating that the US staff directly engaged in the trial
included 654 lawyers, secretaries, translators, interpreters and clerical
staff. 365 of the foregoing were civilians.
The press and radio had a maximum of 249 accredited representatives.
The courthouse in Nuremburg was a bombed shell and had to undergo
extensive repairs before proceedings could be held.
The courthouse kitchen served over 1,500 lunches on court days.44

The take-away from the Nuremberg War Crimes initial trial of leading
governmental officials and military leaders,45 including Hermann Goering (head of
43

The author and his wife in 1998 acquired the entire private collection of trial
transcripts and investigative materials assembled by William Donovan, Director of the
Office of Strategic Services, and donated the Donovan Collection to Cornell University,
where they are available to the public through Cornell’s library website at
lawcollections.library.cornell.edu/nuremberg. Issues involving the conflict between General
Donovan and Justice Jackson (clearly very strong personalities) over the manner in which
evidence should be presented at the trials, including use of defendants as witnesses testifying
pursuant to cooperation agreements, eventually led to Donovan’s resigning from
participation as lead investigator, the details of which are found in a series of interesting
letters between Donovan and Jackson and President Truman, and which are also archived in
the Truman Library. See discussion infra Section IV (discussing the Donovan/Jackson
conflict).
44
Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson, Oct. 7, 1946, in International
Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945 [hereinafter Justice Jackson Letter],
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack63.asp [https://perma.cc/5PUX-KCWB].
45
In addition to the trial of the major Nazi war criminals that covered the period of
November 20, 1945 through October 1, 1946, there were 12 other trials of Nazi war
criminals. See Telford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg
War Crimes Trials Under Control Council Law No. 10, Memorandum for the Secretary of
War, at 36 (1946) [hereinafter Taylor Memorandum]. The chief prosecutor of the first trial
involving senior governmental officials and military leaders was Robert H. Jackson, who
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the German air force and principal Nazi official below Adolph Hitler to head the
German government), Joachim von Ribbentrop, Nazi foreign minister, and Admiral
Erich Raeder and Karl Donitz, chiefs of German naval forces, is clearly spelled out
in Chief Prosecutor Robert H. Jackson’s October 7, 1946 letter to President Harry
Truman.46 That letter, and a treasure trove of other correspondence and documents
on the war crimes proceedings, is part of the archives of the Truman Library.47
Writing about the conviction and sentencing of 19 of the 22 defendants in this
trial, Justice Jackson highlighted the four principles that were set by these
proceedings, stating:
The vital question in which you and the country are interested is
whether the results of this trial justify this heavy expenditure of effort.
While the sentences imposed upon individuals hold dramatic interest, and
while the acquittals, especially of Schact and Von Papen, are regrettable,
the importance of this case is not measurable in terms of the personal fate
of any of the defendants who were already broken and discredited men.
We are too close to the trial to appraise its long-range effects. The only
criterion of success presently applicable is the short-range test as to
whether we have done what we set out to do. This was outlined in my
report to you on June 7, 1945. By this standard we have succeeded.
The importance of the trial lies in the principles to which the Four
Powers became committed by the Agreement, by their participation in the
prosecution, and by the judgment rendered by the Tribunal. What has been
accomplished may be summarized as follows:
1. We negotiated and concluded an Agreement with the four
dominant powers of the earth, signed at London on August 8, 1945, which
for the first time made explicit and unambiguous what was theretofore, as
the Tribunal has declared, implicit in International Law, namely, that to
prepare, incite, or wage a war of aggression, or to conspire with others to
do so, is a crime against international society, and that to persecute,
oppress, or do violence to individuals or minorities on political, racial, or
religious grounds in connection with such a war, or to exterminate,
enslave, or deport civilian populations, is an international crime, and that
for the commission of such crimes individuals are responsible. This
before his tenure as trial counsel representing the United States was a Justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court. Id. at 22. General Telford Taylor succeeded Justice Jackson and was chief
counsel of the remaining 12 separate trials. Id. at 259. Only Jackson prosecuted major Nazi
war criminals who were tried before the International Military Tribunal, and whose jurists
were selected from each of the Allied countries. See id. at 10–11. The remaining 12 trials
were conducted before U.S. military tribunals, also in the same courthouse as the first trial,
and those 12 trials covered the period December 9, 1946 through December 1948. See id.
46
Justice Jackson Letter, supra note 44.
47
Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman 1945-1953, HARRY S. TRUMAN
LIBRARY
&
MUSEUM,
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php
[https://perma.cc/CR8N-RL59].
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Agreement also won the adherence of nineteen additional nations and
represents the combined judgments of the overwhelming majority of
civilized people. It is a basic charter in the International Law of the future.
2. We have also incorporated its principles into a judicial precedent.
‘The power of the precedent,’ Mr. Justice Cardozo said, ‘is the power of
the beaten path.’ One of the chief obstacles to this trial was the lack of a
beaten path. A judgment such as has been rendered shifts the power of the
precedent to the support of these rules of law. No one can hereafter deny
or fail to know that the principles on which the Nazi leaders are adjudged
to forfeit their lives constitute law and law with a sanction.
3. The Agreement devised a workable procedure for the trial of
crimes which reconciled the basic conflicts in Anglo-American, French,
and Soviet procedures. In matters of procedure, legal systems differ more
than in substantive law. But the Charter set up a few simple rules which
assured all of the elements of fair and full hearing, including counsel for
the defense. Representatives of the Four Powers, both on the Bench and at
the Prosecutors’ tables, have had to carry out that Agreement in day-today cooperation for more than a year. The law is a contentious profession
and [] litigation offers countless occasions for differences even among
lawyers who represent the same clients and are trained in a single system
of law. When we add the diversities of interests that exist among our four
nations, and the differences in tradition, viewpoint and language, it will be
seen that our cooperation was beset with real difficulties. My colleagues,
representing the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union,
exemplified the best professional tradition of their countries and have
earned our gratitude for the patience, generosity, good will and
professional ability which they brought to the task. . . .
4. We have documented from German sources the Nazi aggressions,
persecutions, and atrocities with such authenticity and in such detail that
there can be no responsible denial of these crimes in the future and no
tradition of martyrdom of the Nazi leaders can arise among informed
people. No history of this era can be entitled to authority which fails to
take into account the record of Nurnberg. While an effort was made by
Goering and others to portray themselves as ‘glowing patriots,’ their
admitted crimes of violence and meanness, of greed and graft, leave no
ground for future admiration of their characters and their fate leaves no
incentive to emulation of their examples.48
Notwithstanding Justice Jackson’s advice to President Truman that the first
War Crimes trial of Nazi officials achieved the objectives of the Allies serving as a
precedent binding procedure for bringing individuals to court to address charges of
broad international law violations, there was some doubt at the highest levels of the

48

See Justice Jackson Letter, supra note 44.
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Truman Administration whether further War Crimes trials were appropriate.49 Even
Justice Jackson addressed the arguments why additional international War Crimes
trials might not be appropriate.50 In his May 13, 1946 Memorandum for the President
on American Participation in Further International Trials of Nazi War Criminals, he
raised his concerns about the proposed trial of the industrialists, stating he had
misgivings “as to whether a long public attack concentrated on private industry
would not tend to discourage industrial cooperation with our Government in
maintaining its defenses in the future while not at all weakening the Soviet position,
since they do not rely upon private enterprise.”51 He concluded his Memorandum to
the President advising “the balance of my judgment at this time is against further
international trials,” noting that other war criminals would not be free since then
American Military Commissions would be free to prosecute them.52
General Taylor, who succeeded Jackson as chief trial counsel, had a different
perspective, which he outlined in his July 29, 1946 Memorandum for the Secretary
of War in great detail.53 Taylor’s views were adopted by the President.54 As Taylor
explained, if the United States were to oppose further prosecutions, it would deter
bringing individuals before international war crimes tribunals to face charges of
violation of international law.55
The United States, through Mr. Justice Jackson, was the source of the
inspiration and energy which brought about the [Agreement among the
Allies in 1945 to bring war criminals to justice]. The United States has an
enormous moral investment in the declarations of the . . . Agreement. If
the United States now becomes the prime mover for termination of the
Agreement, this cannot help but injure the prospects for universal
acceptance of the principles embodied in the Agreement. A termination
could, to be sure, be presented and explained as being, not a renunciation
of those principles, but a mere decision that one international trial in
Europe is enough. But I doubt that such explanation will completely
satisfy the peoples of the other signatories and adherents who are still
eager to put those principles into practical application.56
While twelve other trials of Nazi war criminals were held through 1948 at the
same Nuremberg Palace of Justice, these subsequent trials were not held before the
IMT but before US military tribunals, where the justices who presided were all either
49

Id.
Id.
51
Taylor Memorandum, supra note 45, at 277. Jackson’s concern about an industrialist
war crimes trial was at odds with the Soviets, who favored such prosecutions, as is clear from
his Memorandum.
52
See id. at 279.
53
Id. app. J at 271–276.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 272.
50
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state or federal jurists in the United States.57 The defendants in the twelve subsequent
trials under the control of General Taylor were afforded the same procedural rights
as those who were tried by Justice Jackson.58 The most notorious of these subsequent
trials is known as the Doctors’ Trial, which covered the period from December 9,
1946 through August 20, 1947.59 The most highly visible doctor, Josef Mengele,
evaded capture—likely moving to Paraguay or Argentina—and of the twenty-three
doctors prosecuted, seven were acquitted, sixteen were convicted, seven received
death sentences, and the remainder faced prison terms of ten years to life.60 Many of
the defendants’ prison sentences were commuted for political reasons by the High
Counsel of Germany, John J. McCloy, in the early 1950s and they were released
from prison during that decade.61 At that time, the United States needed a strong
German ally as it faced the Cold War with the Soviets and the commutation was part
of a policy of détente with German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.62
57

While there were twelve subsequent war crimes trials involving another 100 or more
Nazi officials, including lawyers and jurists in the Judges’ Trials that started on March 5,
1947 and ended on December 4, 1947, and that fact suggests that Justice Jackson was
prescient about the precedent value of the prosecutions, the fact all twelve subsequent
proceedings were somewhat streamlined and solely before US jurists suggests that the
concerns of those opposing the continued prosecutions were adopted. In any event, political
reasons ultimately resulted in commutation of those imprisoned after their convictions, just
as political reasons explain why the war crimes proceedings were initiated and pursued to an
end.
58
Justice Jackson emphasized the importance of maintaining the same procedural rights
identified in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the remaining trials, which
he outlined in his May 13, 1946 Memorandum for the President on American Participation
in Further International Trials of Nazi War Criminals. See London Agreement, supra note
13. This Memorandum was one of many documents Jackson prepared following the
conviction of the major Nazi war criminals and after Justice Jackson concluded that he would
not oversee any other trials and would return to the Supreme Court of the United States from
which he took a leave of absence to take on the Nuremberg Trials. Id. The issue of
compliance with the Charter procedures in these 12 subsequent trials also was addressed in
General Taylor’s Memorandum for the Secretary of War dated July 29, 1946. See Taylor
Memorandum, supra note 45. Both documents can be found in the Tribune Library Archives
at www.trumanlibrary.org.
59
The author and his wife were fortunate to meet one of the court stenographers of the
Doctor war crimes trials, proceedings held after the initial government and military
defendants were tried. Vivian Spitz, who died in 2014, was a young court reporter who was
part of the civilian staff at Nuremberg and who was the court reporter assigned to the
Doctors’ Trials. Her experience there is documented in her gripping account of these
proceedings, published by First Sentient Publications in 2005, entitled “Doctors from Hell:
The Horrific Account of Nazi Experiments on Humans.” After the Holocaust deniers became
active in the late 1990s, Ms. Spitz traveled the country offering blunt evidence that such
claims were outrageous fantasies and lies. Ms. Spitz was an honored guest at the Broadway
re-release of “Judgment at Nuremberg” in 2001.
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IV. THE CONFLICT IN PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
There is an interesting sidelight to the prosecution of the Nazi war criminals. It
is the conflict between General Donovan and Chief Counsel Justice Jackson, which
ultimately led to the resignation of Donovan from the prosecution team and impacted
how the evidence was presented. Donovan was a unique character in US history and
in the US role in WWII.63 Before he headed the Office of Strategic Services (“OSS”),
established in 1942 by executive order of President Roosevelt, Donovan was a
prominent attorney in New York City, a WWI veteran who was awarded the
Congressional Medal of Honor, and a tenacious United States Attorney for the
Northern District of New York.64 The OSS, which he created, conducted espionage
activities behind enemy lines, primarily in the European theater of war.65 The OSS
was the predecessor of the CIA, the latter created with passage under the Truman
Administration of the 1947 National Security Act.66
As a former prosecutor, Donovan believed the best way to present evidence of
war crimes would include the use of accomplices who traded their testimony for
some form of leniency by the prosecution team.67 Justice Jackson rejected this
approach, believing the war crimes evidence could effectively be presented through
the documents maintained by the Nazis, seized during the close of the war, and
63

In the author’s opinion, the best biography of General “Wild Bill” Donovan is the
biography by Anthony Cave Brown. See ANTHONY CAVE BROWN, WILD BILL DONOVAN:
THE LAST HERO (1982).
64
Id. at 349–65, 551–64.
65
National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §§ 401–405.
66
An example of Donovan’s perspective that getting a Nazi defendant to cooperate and
testify would be of value to the prosecution is found in his letter dated November 27, 1945
to Justice Jackson, which is among the private papers of President Truman and is found in
the Truman Library archives at www.trumanlibrary.org. In that letter, he offered that “a
confession from the last sane leader of the gang might well be of value in a larger sense. This
was not intended as a ‘stunt,’ or as a dramatic episode, but as a very practical means of
bringing home to the German people the guilt of these men.” Letter from General Donovan
to Justice Jackson, Nov. 27, 1945, HARRY S. TRUMAN: LIBRARY & MUSEUM [hereinafter
Donovan’s November 27, 1945 Letter], https://trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collecti
ons/nuremberg/documents/index.php?documentid=7-5&pagenumber=2 [https://perma.cc/
9WJ4-GFZS]. In that same letter, he explained his criticism of the prosecution approach,
stating, “it needed an affirmative human aspect with German as well as foreign witnesses.”
Id. In a subsequent letter to President Truman dated December 1, 1945, Justice Jackson
explained that his and Donovan’s difference of approach to the prosecution ended in
Donovan’s departure from the U.S. prosecution team. Letter from Robert Jackson to Harry
S. Truman, accompanied by related materials, December 1, 1945, HARRY S. TRUMAN:
LIBRARY & MUSEUM [hereinafter Jackson’s December 1, 1945 Letter],
https://trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?d
ocumentdate=1945-12-01&documentid=7-6&pagenumber=1
[https://perma.cc/M825YYTH].
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assembled as exhibits for the trials.68 Donovan believed that the approach to trial of
the case primarily as a documents driven presentation would result in a lack of
compelling evidence, in the words of accomplices, of the intent, the crimes, and their
execution.69
The Truman Archives contain examples of this, and ultimately the
correspondence from Donovan of his resignation.70 Thus, in Jackson’s letter of
November 26, 1945 to Donovan, Jackson made clear “[y]ou and I appear to have
developed fundamental differences in viewpoint about this case. Time alone will tell
which of us is right, but there can be no doubt that the case cannot follow both of
our lines.”71 As Jackson told Donovan, “my own confidence grew with study of the
document analyses that our case could safely rest wholly on documents and that
witnesses need be used, if at all, only incidentally. With this you disagreed and
proposed more reliance on oral testimony.”72
Jackson took particular aim at Donovan’s belief that some of the Nazi General
staff would present compelling evidence in exchange for some consideration offered
them to induce their testimony.73 Jackson said,
I do not think we can afford to negotiate with any of these defendants or
their counsel for testimony. . . . I would not put one of the defendants on
the stand as our witness. To use one of them ourselves will create the
impression that there was some kind of bargain about his testimony,
opening the door to that defendant to plead for leniency on the ground he
was ‘helpful’ and may give a background for claims that promises were
made to that effect. My view is, therefore, that we should prove our case
against these defendants with no use of them as witnesses.74
Jackson all but noted the value such turn-coat witnesses provide for presentation of
dramatic trial evidence that would mesmerize the public. As he wrote, “I know the
‘turning of state’s evidence’ would be dramatic and sensational—but I think it better
for the reputation of our case that each defendant do any confessing on his own
behalf—not on ours.”75
This was hardly a pleasant disagreement, as Donovan’s November 26, 1945
letter to Jackson demonstrates. That letter is also found in the Truman Archives, and
bears on its face the mark of confidentiality as Papers of Harry S. Truman. Donovan
68

Id.
Id.
70
See, e.g., Letter from Robert Jackson to William Donovan, November 26, 1945,
HARRY S. TRUMAN: LIBRARY & MUSEUM, https://trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_coll
ections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?documentdate=1945-11-26&documentid=7-4&
pagenumber=1 [https://perma.cc/4ADC-CWGX].
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
69

744

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

even proposed that in lieu of the manner in which the defendants were to be tried
and surmised “perhaps it would have been better to have shot the guilty ones” instead
of the trial proceedings.76 As for use of accomplices, Donovan offered the broader
principle—“a confession from the last sane leader of the gang might well be of value
in a larger sense. This [use of accomplice testimony with some inducement to the
defendant] was not intended as a ‘stunt,’ or as a dramatic episode, but as a very
practical means of bringing home to the German people the guilt of these men.”77
Jackson accepted Donovan’s resignation—perhaps more a test of strong willed
and proud men than a test of principle in terms of trial strategy.78 Jackson explained
the Donovan resignation to President Truman in his letter dated December 1, 1945,
reporting “[w]hen I asked him to work with me I was repeatedly told that he would
not work in second place with anybody. I knew the difficulties of that, but he was
the head of O.S.S. and I needed what help that organization could give.”79 Jackson
then explained that their ideas about presenting the cases “were far apart,” so far
apart that Jackson reported “I had to tell him I would not put him on the floor to
conduct any part of the case.”80
The Donovan and Jackson conflict on the extent to which accomplices should
be used in international war crimes prosecutions turning state’s evidence and
recounting their and other defendants’ criminal acts in consideration of some
leniency in sentencing is a conflict that has to impact how more recent international
war criminal proceedings are tried. In fact, the United Nations International Criminal
Court procedures specifically contemplate the use of accomplice witnesses and a
means to provide them with protection if they turn state’s evidence and testify.81
Still, the reluctance expressed by Justice Jackson to make “deals” with Nazi officials
for their testimony has to impact the approach to building the prosecution cases
where war crimes occur and national leaders are brought to justice.
V. TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS
By contrast to the Four Powers Allies creation of the tribunal to prosecute Nazi
war criminals, in Japan, General George MacArthur, as Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers in occupied Japan, established the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East (“IMTFE”).82 The Japanese War Crimes trials were not created by
an international agreement but by MacArthur’s proclamation in 1946 pursuant to his
authority to “issue all orders for the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the
76
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occupation and control of Japan, and all directives supplementary thereto.”83 The
charter establishing the tribunals for Japanese war criminals, explicitly gave
MacArthur as Supreme Commander the power to appoint the judges from the
countries that had signed Japan’s instrument of surrender, and each of the countries
was authorized to appoint a judge of the tribunals.84
The IMTFE presided over the prosecution of nine senior Japanese political
leaders and 18 military leaders.85 Among the military leaders, who also was Japan’s
prime minister from 1941–1944, convicted, sentenced to death, and hanged, was
General Hideki Tojo.86 The most senior civilian official convicted, sentenced to
death, and executed was former prime minister of Japan, Koki Hirota.87 MacArthur
explicitly did not include Emperor Hirohito and his family as defendants in the
proceedings, allowing Hirohito to retain his position on the throne as part of
MacArthur’s plan for Japanese de-militarization and democratization.88 The Tokyo
War Crimes trials, as they were also called, occurred from May 1946 through
November 1948.89 The tribunals found all defendants guilty with sentences ranging
from seven-year imprisonments to death.90
VI. THE FUTURE OF WAR CRIMES PROCEEDINGS
Years after the prosecution of Nazi and Japanese war criminals, the United
Nations created an International Criminal Tribunal as part of its commitment to
bring to justice persons engaged in war crimes, as those crimes were defined during
the WWII proceedings.91 Ultimately, specific tribunals, organized by the United
Nations, were created to bring to justice war criminals.92 In 1993, a tribunal was
formed to prosecute former Yugoslav officials and military personnel for atrocities
committed during what is known as the Yugoslav wars.93 In 1994, a tribunal was
formed to prosecute officials in Rwanda for evidence of ethnic genocides.94 There
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is no permanent tribunal, however, as the United States stands as a vocal opposition
to such a criminal court with a pronounced antipathy to such courts proceeding
against US military personnel.95 As the US State Department has stated, there are
“insufficient checks and balances on the authority of the ICC prosecutor and judges”
and “insufficient protection against politicized prosecutions or other abuses.”96 In
the absence of US support, there will be no permanent tribunal and, at best, on an
individual basis, the United Nations will create separate tribunals to address war
crimes, leaving the choice of such prosecutions open to criticism that political
objectives not appropriate for the wielding of such international resources govern,
thereby diminishing the precedential value of the wielding of such power.
Today, prosecution of war criminals is undertaken on a case by case basis by a
permanent ICC established pursuant to the Rome Statute of 1998. As the US State
Department has made clear, the US will not agree to a permanent court but rather
accepts a case-by-case prosecution thereby avoiding the prospect of politics or other
public relations considerations serving as the basis for singling out US citizens,
including US political officials. We are 70 plus years away from that time of
international unity to bring to justice the military and political officials of
vanquished nations. We do not have that unity today. In the absence of the US
support of such a permanent court, the efficacy of international criminal tribunals as
not only the source of law on the substantive crimes prosecuted but on procedural
obligations of the prosecution and rights of the defendants is doubtful.
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